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I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2012, the New York Times reported that Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.'s
(Wal-Mart) largest foreign subsidiary, Wal-Mart de M6xico, had engaged in a
"campaign of bribery" in Mexico and that, in 2005, Wal-Mart had investigated
and then covered up over $24 million in bribes paid to speed up building
permits there. 1 The bribes and cover-up could amount to violations of the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),2 and the Times reported that the
company had begun a new investigation and informed the Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 3 Within weeks,
Wal-Mart shareholders had filed a dozen lawsuits against the company alleging
that Wal-Mart had made misleading disclosures and that the company directors
and officers had breached their fiduciary duties, exposing the company to FCPA
liability. 4
A recent surge in government enforcement of the FCPA 5 has increased
opportunities for private plaintiffs to bring collateral civil actions. In response to
FCPA investigations, shareholders now routinely file derivative suits, securities
fraud class actions, or both. Collateral shareholder lawsuits may allege, for
example, that the directors violated their fiduciary duties by failing to oversee
the company and avoid or detect the FCPA violation or that the company misled
shareholders by not disclosing the conditions that led to the violation. To date,
FCPA-based shareholder litigation has enjoyed limited success, with many
actions dismissed at early stages of the lawsuits. 6 Nevertheless, a number of the
suits have been settled, some for amounts exceeding the government penalties
paid by the company for the FCPA violations.
I David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level
Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012, at Al.2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
3 Barstow, supra note 1, at A l (reporting that Wal-Mart had informed the DOJ that it
had begun an internal investigation into possible violations of the FCPA and discussed the
matter in a filing with the SEC).
4 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 29 (June 1,2012).
5For a discussion of the surge in FCPA enforcement, see Amy Deen Westbrook,
Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 522 55 (2011).
6 See infra Part IV.
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Shareholder litigation based on company behavior that violates the FCPA is
significant for several reasons. In the FCPA context, the threat of private
litigation increases the impact of an FCPA violation by increasing a company's
liability. Moreover, parallel shareholder litigation may also subtly expand
FCPA liability by functioning as an FCPA private right of action.
FCPA-related shareholder lawsuits may also be of more general doctrinal
significance. Allegations that directors failed to fulfill their fiduciary duties of
oversight may constitute "Caremark claims," 7 which inform the fundamental
duties of corporate managers. Similarly, shareholder allegations of inaccurate
books and records and inadequate accounting controls may be brought as
securities fraud class action suits based on the company's misleading disclosure.
Both corporation and securities law cases, in the FCPA context, may disturb the
uneasy allocation of state and federal regulation of business associations.
This Article examines recent shareholder litigation based on company
behavior that violates the FCPA. Part Ii introduces the FCPA and the current
surge in its enforcement. Part III examines the increase in shareholder actions
based on FCPA violations. Parts IV and V analyze shareholder derivative and
securities fraud class action lawsuits, respectively, in terms of what
shareholders are alleging and how their suits are faring. Part VI draws
preliminary conclusions about the legal consequences of increased collateral
shareholder litigation based on FCPA violations.
II. THE FCPA: ENFORCEMENT AND EXPENSE
A. Recent FCPA Enforcement. Wider and Deeper
The FCPA was passed in 1977 to address corruption in international
business transactions. 8 Generally, the FCPA prohibits the bribery of foreign
officials in order to obtain or retain business. 9 The FCPA's anti-bribery
provisions apply to a variety of actors: U.S. persons and corporations,
companies with publicly-traded securities in the United States (issuers), and
anyone who happens to be in U.S. territory. 10 The FCPA's accounting
provisions require issuers to keep accurate books and records and to devise and
maintain a system of internal accounting controls that provides reasonable
assurances that their transactions and assets are properly maintained. 11
7 This phrase describes cases structurally similar to In re Caremark International Inc.
Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), which are discussed below in Part
IV.A.
8 Lamb v. Phillip Morris Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1028 (6th Cir. 1990).
9 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a) (2006).
'
0 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a) (2006).
11 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2006).
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FCPA enforcement was anemic for three decades. Between 1977 and 2007,
there were a total of approximately 105 actions, 12 with generally low fines. 13
Since 2007, however, enforcement has increased. 14 In the last five years, DOJ
and the SEC have brought over 230 enforcement actions, 15 with more
investigations pending. At the same time, fines have increased. 16 In 2007, the
government settled an FCPA action against Baker Hughes Inc. (Baker Hughes)
for the then-record-breaking total of $44 million. 17 That record has been broken
over a dozen times since then.
DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement in 2011 included actions and penalties
totaling more than $508 million. 8 2011 actually represented a slight decrease in
total penalties from prior years: in 2010, twenty-three companies paid a total of
$1.8 billion; in 2009, eleven companies paid a total of $644 million; and in
2008, eleven companies paid a total of $890 million. 19
12 SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA DIGEST: CASES AND REVIEW RELEASES
RELATING TO BRIBES TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
OF 1977 (Jan. 3, 2012), available at http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/bbla7bff-
ad52-4cf9-88b9-9d99e001 dd5f Presentation/PublicationAttachment/590a9fc7-2617-41fc-
9aef-04727f927eO7/FCPA-Digest-Jan2012.pdf; FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/2012.html (last visited
June 4, 2012); SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last modified May 8, 2012).
13 SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, supra note 12.
14 See Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Impact of Anti-
Bribery Enforcement Action on Targeted Firms 1 (Feb. 27, 2012) (unpublished article),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1573222 (noting that of the 115 anti-bribery
enforcement actions against publicly-traded companies between 1977 and 2011, over 57% of
them were between 2007 and 2011). The reasons for this increased enforcement are
significant but beyond the scope of this Article. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 510-21,
530 48.
15 Gibson Dunn, 2011 Year-End FCPA Update (Jan. 3, 2012), available at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/201 lYearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf.
16 SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, supra note 12.
17 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Baker Hughes Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to
Bribing Kazakh Official and Agrees to Pay $11 Million Criminal Fine as Part of Largest
Combined Sanction Ever Imposed in FCPA Case (Apr. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/April/07 crm 296.html.
18 Richard L. Cassin, 2011 Enforcement Index, FCPA BLOG (Jan. 2, 2012, 7:18 AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/1/2/201 I-enforcement-index.html (listing actions
against Aon Corporation, Armor Holdings Inc., Ball Corporation, Bridgestone Corporation,
Comverse Technology Inc., Diageo plc, IBM, JGC Corporation, Johnson & Johnson,
Lindsey Manufacturing, Magyar Telecom (and majority owner Deutsche Telekom, Maxwell
Technologies Inc., Rockwell Automation Inc., Tenaris, Tyson Foods Inc., and Watts Water
Technologies, Inc.).
19 Richard L. Cassin, Corporate Enforcement Since 2006, FCPA BLOG (Jan. 3, 2012,
7:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/1/3/corporate-enforcement-since-2006.html.
Estimates of total penalties vary slightly but the trend is clear. See SHEARMAN & STERLING
LLP, supra note 12, at viii; ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, FCPA & GLOBAL ANTI-CORRUPTION
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Currently, the "top ten" actions 20 in terms of total penalties paid by
companies to DOJ and the SEC 2 1 are:
1. Siemens AG: $800 million (2008);22
2. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC / Halliburton Co.: $579 million (2009);23
3. BAE Systems PLC: $400 million (2010);24
4. Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. / ENI, S.p.A: $365 million (2010);25
5. Technip S.A.: $338 million (2010);26
INSIGHTS 4 (Winter 2012), available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/
FCPA%20Newsletter%202 I4.pdf.
20 Richard L. Cassin, With Aagyar in New Top Ten, It's 90% Non-U.S., FCPA BLOG
(Dec. 29, 2011, 1:28 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/12/29/with-magyar-in-new-
top-ten-its-90-non-us.html (noting that nine-tenths of the top penalties were paid by non-
U.S. companies). Wal-Mart shareholders have alleged that the FCPA investigations may
result in billions of dollars of liability for the company. Verified Shareholder Derivative
Complaint at para. 10, Cal. State Teachers' Ret. Sys. ex rel. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Alvarez, No. 7490, 2012 WL 1557306 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2012) [hereinafter Wal-Mart
Complaint] (referring to "scorched-earth investigations").
21 If the "top ten" list counted individuals, it would include Jeffrey Tesler, a former
consultant to Kellogg, Brown, & Root Inc. and its joint venture partners, who pleaded guilty
in March 2011 to conspiring to violate and to violating the FCPA and agreed to forfeit $149
million. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, UK Solicitor Pleads Guilty for Role in Bribing
Nigerian Government Officials as Part of KBR Joint Venture Scheme (Mar. 11, 2011),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/201 ]/March/ 11-crm-313.html. The surge in
FCPA enforcement against individuals is another interesting development, but beyond the
scope of this Article.
22 press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead
Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in
Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1 105.html; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC
Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm.
2 3 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC Pleads Guilty to
Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $402 Million Criminal Fine (Feb. 11, 2009),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-crm-112.html; Press Release,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges KBR and Halliburton for FCPA Violations (Feb.
11, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-23.htm.
24 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered
to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2010 /March/1 0-crm-209.html [hereinafter BAE Press Release].
25Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. Resolves
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 Million Criminal
Penalty (July 7, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/July/10-crm-
780.html; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Italian Company and
Dutch Subsidiary in Scheme Bribing Nigerian Officials with Carloads of Cash (July 7,
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-119.htm.
26 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Technip S.A. Resolves Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 Million Criminal Penalty (June 28,
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/June/l0-crm-751.html; Press
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6. JGC Corporation: $218.8 million (201 1);27
7. Daimler AG: $185 million (2010);28
8. Alcatel-Lucent: $137 million (2010);2 9
9. Magyar Telekom / Deutsche Telekom: $95 million (2011);30 and
10. Panalpina: $81.8 million (2010). 3 1
Not surprisingly, many of these companies have also been subject to
collateral shareholder litigation based on their FCPA violations.
B. FCPA Violations Are Expensive
The "top ten" list above is a warning for companies, but a list of the "top
fifty" fines might be even more sobering because of the large number of
companies caught in the FCPA net. Moreover, fines may not be the only cost
assessed by the government. The SEC and DOJ are now employing additional
tools such as deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements. 32 Ongoing
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Technip with FCPA Violations (June 28,
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-1 10.htm.
27 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, JGC Corporation Resolves Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay a $218.8 Million Criminal Penalty (Apr. 6,
2011), available athttp://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/April/11-crm-431.html.
2 8 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Daimler AG and Three Subsidiaries Resolve
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agree to Pay $93.6 Million in Criminal
Penalties (Apr. 1, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/April/10-crm-
360.html; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Daimler AG with Global
Bribery (Apr. 1,2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-51.htm.
2 9press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Alcatel-Lucent S.A. and Three Subsidiaries
Agree to Pay $92 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation (Dec. 27,
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov /opa/pr/2010/December/ 10-crm-1481.html; Press
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Alcatel-Lucent with FCPA Violations
(Dec. 27, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-258.htm.
3 0 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Magyar Telekom and Deutsche Telekom
Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agree to Pay Nearly $64 Million in
Combined Criminal Penalties (Dec. 29, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2011 /December/ 11-crm-1714.html; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC
Charges Magyar Telekom and Former Executives with Bribing Officials in Macedonia and
Montenegro (Dec. 29, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-
279.htm.
31 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Oil Services Companies and a Freight
Forwarding Company Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay More
Than $156 Million in Criminal Penalties (Nov. 4, 2010), available at http:/www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/November/10-crm-1251.html; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, SEC Charges Seven Oil Services and Freight Forwarding Companies for
Widespread Bribery of Customs Officials (Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2010/2010-214.htm.
32 See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Bizjet Int'l Sales &
Support, Inc., No. 12CR-61CVE (N.D. Okla. Mar. 14, 2012), available at https:/
www.traceinternational2.org/compendium/file.asp?id-1733. An FCPA conviction may also
result in debarment, or in a company being ineligible for export licenses or not allowed to
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responsibilities, such as hiring a compliance monitor and establishing a new
compliance program, are also expensive. 33
Even suspicion of violating the FCPA can be expensive. A company may
incur substantial expenses to conduct an internal investigation before or
concurrent with a government investigation. In In re Avon Products Inc.
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that
Avon Products Inc. (Avon) had already incurred $114 million in costs in
connection with its FCPA investigation in 2009 and 2010 and expected to incur
an additional $96 million in 2011. 34 These expenses did not include any
financial penalty that may be assessed by DOJ or the SEC.35 Nor did the over
$200 million total include the cost of any new compliance measures that Avon
may have to establish.
An FCPA investigation imposes indirect costs on a company, too. Perhaps
in recognition of the direct costs likely to be borne by the company, the
disclosure of an FCPA investigation may drive down a company's share price.
Some estimates put the mean one-day share price drop in reaction to the initial
revelation of bribery at a publicly-traded company, at least when the bribery is
accompanied by misreporting or fraud in the company's financial statements, at
-3.11% of share value, with a mean loss of -8.98% of share value cumulated
participate in securities business and conduct business with government agencies. Mark P.
Goodman, Daniel J. Fetterman & Bruce E. Yannett, Defending Clients in Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Investigations, in DANIEL J. FETTERMAN & MARK P. GOODMAN, DEFENDING
CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS IN GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS § 9.17 (2011)
(describing other effects of an FCPA conviction).
33 Sarah Johnson, After the Settlement, He'll Be Watching You, CFO.coM (July 11,
2011), http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14586152 (explaining that Innospec expected the
cost of hiring Kevin Abikoff as a monitor, required as part of its FCPA settlement, to be
about $3.9 million); Client Memorandum from Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, Imposition of
Compliance Monitors in FCPA Settlements Is Down, but Recent Court Ruling Increases the
Risk of Public Access to Monitor Reports (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.willkie.com/files/
tbl s29Publications%5CFileUpload5686%5C4063%5CImposition of Compliance
Monitors.pdf (discussing John Ashcroft's 2008 estimate that eighteen months of his work as
a monitor would cost between $28 million and $52 million). In March 2008, the DOJ issued
the Memorandum on the Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements
and Non-Prosecution Agreements with Corporations, known as the Morford Memo, to
clarify the use of monitors. Memorandum from the U.S. Dep't of Justice, Selection and Use
of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements with
Corporations (Mar. 7, 2008), www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/dag-030708.pdf.
34 Verified Consolidated Shareholder Derivative Complaint at para. 6, In re Avon
Prods., Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., No. 1:10-cv-05560-KBF (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2011)
[hereinafter Avon Consolidated Complaint]. The 2009 and 2010 costs were disclosed in
Avon's 2010 Form 10-K filing with the SEC. Avon Products Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-
K, p. 29) (Feb. 24, 2011). Avon's 2011 Form 10-K filing disclosed $93.3 million in FCPA-
related expenses. Avon Products Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 27 (Feb. 29, 2012).
35 The government investigation of Avon is ongoing. Joe Palazzolo & Emily Glazer,
Foreign Bribe Case at Avon Presented to Grand Jury, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2012, at Al
(reporting that federal prosecutors presented evidence to a grand jury regarding improper
payments by Avon in China).
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over all key announcements about the bribery and the related enforcement
action. 36 In their consolidated shareholder derivative complaint, Avon
shareholders noted that, following an April 13, 2010 report in the Wall Street
Journal revealing that Avon had suspended four executives in an investigation
of bribery in the company's China operations, 37 Avon shares fell 8%.38 In its
May 3, 2012 shareholder derivative complaint, the California State Teachers'
Retirement System alleged that Wal-Mart stock lost 8% of its value in the three
trading days following the Times article. 39
III. INCREASE IN COLLATERAL ACTIONS
A. An FCPA Private Right ofAction?
The de facto emergence of private actions in the FCPA context is somewhat
surprising. The FCPA is enforced by DOJ and the SEC; the statute does not
provide for a private right of action.40 In 1990, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
government's exclusive right to enforce the FCPA.4 1 In Lamb v. Phillip Morris,
U.S. tobacco growers alleged that Phillip Morris, Inc. and B.A.T. Industries
PLC were purchasing foreign tobacco at below-market prices thanks to their
foreign payments in violation of the FCPA. 42 Because the purchase of non-U.S.
tobacco necessarily reduced the amount of U.S. tobacco the defendants
purchased, Lamb and several fellow growers filed suit under U.S. antitrust laws
and later added an FCPA claim.4 3
In reviewing and affirming a lower court's dismissal of the FCPA claim, the
Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that an implied private right of action exists
36 See Karpoffet al., supra note 14, at 3.
3 7 Ellen Byron, Avon Suspends Executives in Inquiry, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2010, at
B1.
3 8 Avon Consolidated Complaint, supra note 34, at para. 8 9 (noting that Avon shares
closed at $31.99 per share after the Wall Street Journal article was published on April 13,
2010, down from their $34.76 close on April 12, 2010).3 9 Wal-Mart Complaint, supra note 20, at para. 112 (referring to David Barstow's April
21, 2012 article). Wal-Mart's share price decrease has been estimated to have cost the
company $17.27 billion in market capitalization, translating into a loss of almost $720 in
value for each dollar in bribes that Wal-Mart had paid. Nigam Arora, Mexican Bribery Gave
Me a Chance to A/ake Money in Wal-A/art, FORBES.COM (May 17, 2012, 12:44 PM),
http: //www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2 0 12/0517/mexican-bribery-gave-me-a-
chance-to-make-money-in-wal-mart/3/. Wal-Mart also faces a investigation by the U.S.
House of Representatives. See House Democrats Launch Probe into Wal-Mart's Alleged
FCPA Violations, 44 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 859 (BNA) (Apr. 30, 2012).
40 There have been attempts to expand the field of persons eligible to sue companies for
FCPA violations. See, e.g., Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2011, H.R. 3531,
112th Cong. § 2 (2011) (authorizing U.S. companies to sue certain foreign entities that
gained business by violating the FCPA).
4 1 Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1024 (6th Cir. 1990).
4 2 1d. at 1025 (holding that the FCPA did not create a private right of action).
4 31d.
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under the FCPA.44 The court's reasoning included, inter alia, an examination of
Congress's intent in passing the FCPA. The court found that, although there
was a reference to a private right of action in a House report and an early Senate
version of the act, because the conference report accompanying the final
legislative compromise did not mention such a right, Congress did not intend
one.4 5 The court also decided that a private right of action under the FCPA
would be inconsistent with the "legislative scheme." 46 The court explained that
the FCPA prefers compliance (pre-violation measures) over prosecution (post-
violation enforcement) and a private right of action would introduce plaintiffs
primarily interested in the latter.47
An earlier Northern District of California decision, Lewis v. Sporck,48 came
to a similar conclusion regarding the accounting and books and records
provisions of the FCPA. In a shareholder derivative action on behalf of National
Semiconductor Corporation (NSC), Lewis claimed that NSC managers violated
the FCPA accounting provisions in connection with falsification of testing data
and theft of trade secrets.4 9 The court dismissed the FCPA books and records
claim, agreeing with NSC that no private right of action exists under the
provisions.50
The court did not consider the House report that had mentioned a private
right of action because, at the time the report was drafted, the FCPA legislation
had included only the anti-bribery provisions and not the accounting
provisions. 51 After examining the legislative history, the court found that "[t]he
purpose of Section 13(b)(2) ... was to deter bribery of foreign officials by
American corporations," 52 and the inclusion of accounting provisions was to
discourage companies from making illegal payments and to offer investors and
the corporation the benefit of accurate bookkeeping. 53 The court recognized that
the SEC had broadened the scope of Section 13(b)(2) to include "all egregious
violations of standard accounting principles," but reasoned that letting "private
plaintiffs sue under this section whenever a standard accounting principle is
violated ... would broaden the coverage of this statute far beyond any limit
4 4 Id at 1030.
45 Id. at 1029. The court acknowledged the 1977 House report that, in one place, stated
"[t]he committee intends that courts shall recognize a private cause of action based on this
legislation ... on behalf of persons who suffer injury as a result of prohibited corporate
bribery." Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 10 (1977)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
4 6 Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1029.
4 7 1d at 1029-30.
4 8 Lewis ex rel Nat'l Semiconductor Corp. v. Sporck, 612 F. Supp. 1316 (N.D. Cal.
1985).
4 9 1d. at 1320 21.50 1d at 1333-34.
5 11d at 1330.
52 1d at 1332-33 (citing S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 3-4 (1997), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N 4098, 4101-02).
5 31d. at 1333.
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conceived of by Congress [because] ... [p]rivate plaintiffs, unlike the SEC, are
not limited by any notion that they are to act in the public interest. '54
Finally, the court considered whether the cause of action was one
traditionally relegated to state law, so that it would be inappropriate to infer an
action based solely on federal law. 55 The court concluded that Lewis's claims
were compensable under state law as breaches of fiduciary duty. 56 Thus, Lewis
acknowledged the legal development at issue in this Article: shareholders are
unhappy about the cost of FCPA violations and are seeking redress through
collateral means.
B. Shareholder Suits Based on FCPA Violations
1. Types of Suits
Historically the number of collateral civil suits based on FCPA liability, like
the number of FCPA cases, was small.57 The recent surge in FCPA enforcement
has sparked a parallel increase in shareholder litigation based on the facts of
those FCPA cases. 58
FCPA-related shareholder suits come in two flavors: derivative actions and
securities fraud class actions. 59 In a derivative action, shareholders file suit
against some or all of the board of directors or executive officers on behalf of
the corporation itself. The theory is that a corporation harmed by its managers
will not sue because the managers control the corporation. Therefore, in a
derivative action, a shareholder files suit on behalf of the corporation: the
corporation is suffering the wrong, and any remedy obtained will belong to the
corporation.
The other type of shareholder suit that may be filed in response to news of
an FCPA violation is a securities fraud suit. Often filed as class actions, such
suits may allege violations of the Exchange Act § 10(b)60 by the corporation for
failing to disclose (or disclosing in a misleading manner) its FCPA-violating
activity or an internal, SEC, or DOJ investigation into it. Many of these suits
allege that the company's misrepresentations or omissions artificially inflated a
company's share price. The recovery in a securities fraud class action accrues to
the shareholders.
54 Lewis, 612 F. Supp. at 1333.
5 5 1d. at 1327 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).56 1d. at 1333.
5 7 SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, supra note 12.
5 8 Although precise numbers of suits are not available, the recent increase has been the
subject of substantial comment. See, e.g., The Rise in Litigation from FCPA Enforcement,
FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Feb. 9, 2009), http://www.foley.com/the-rise-in-litigation-from-
fcpa-enforcement-02-09-2009/.
59 It is relevant to note that both types of suits are largely lawyer-driven, calling into
question the actual level of shareholder motivation.60 Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); see also infra Part V.A.
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Companies confronting shareholder litigation may face either, or both,
types of suits. 61 In addition, defendant companies are likely to find multiple
suits, which may or may not be consolidated, brought against them. 62
2. Predicates
Some of the collateral suits are triggered by disclosure of FCPA settlements
with the SEC and DOJ. For example, derivative actions against Tidewater
Inc.,6 3 Halliburton Co., 64 Baker Hughes, 65 and Johnson & Johnson 66 followed
announcements of substantial penalties to be paid by the companies. Other
shareholder suits are triggered earlier, by the announcement of a government
FCPA investigation. For example, securities fraud actions were filed against
Siemens AG,67 Invision Technologies, Inc. (Invision), 6 8 Titan, Inc., 69 and
61 Faro Technologies, Inc. and SciClone, for example, have faced both kinds of
shareholder suits. See Class Action Complaint at para. 1, Johnson v. Faro Techs., Inc., No.
6:06-cv-00057-ACC-DAB (M.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 2006); Verified Shareholder Derivative
Complaint at para. 1, Alverson v. Caldwell, No. 6:08-cv-00045-ACC-DAB (M.D. Fla. Jan.
10, 2008) [hereinafter Faro Derivative Complaint]; Class Action Complaint at para. 1,
Karner v. SciClone Pharms., Inc., No. 5:10-cv-03991-JW, 2010 WL 4638276 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 7, 2010) [hereinafter SciClone Class Action Complaint]; Verified Shareholder
Derivative Complaint at para. 1, Constr. Indus. & Laborers Joint Pension Trust ex rel.
SciClone Pharm., Inc. v. Saxe, No. CIV-499030 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 2010) [hereinafter
SciClone Derivative].
62 Parker Drilling Company faced multiple derivative suits. See Verified Shareholder
Derivative Complaint at para. 1, Maresca ex rel. Parker Drilling Co. v. Parker, No. 4:1 0-cv-
03066 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Maresca Parker Complaint]; Freuler ex rel.
Parker Drilling Co. v. Parker, 803 F. Supp. 2d 630, 630-31 (S.D. Tex. 2011). Avon faced
several derivative actions, which were consolidated by the court. See generally Avon
Consolidated Complaint, supra note 34.
63 Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint at para. 1, Strong ex rel. Tidewater Inc.
v. Taylor, No. 2:11-cv-00392-JTM-ALC (E.D. La. Feb. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Tidewater
Complaint].64 Plaintiffs Original Petition, Policemen & Firemen Ret. Sys. of Detroit ex rel.
Halliburton Co. v. Cornelison, No. 2009-29987, 2009 WL 145562 (Harris Cnty. Dist. Ct.
Tex. May 14, 2009).
65 Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint at para. 1, Midwestern Teamsters
Pension Trust Fund ex rel. Baker Hughes Inc. v. Deaton, No. 4:08-cv-01 809 (S.D. Tex. June
6, 2008) [hereinafter Baker Hughes Complaint].66 Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint at para. 1, Wollman ex rel. Johnson &
Johnson v. Coleman, No. 3:11-cv-02511-MLC-TJB (D.N.J. May 2, 2011) [hereinafter J&J
Complaint].67 Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws at para. 1,
Johnson v. Siemens AG, No. 1:09-cv-05310-JG-RER (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2009) [hereinafter
Siemens Complaint].6 8 Class Action Complaint at para. 1, Engelken v. Invision Techs., Inc., No. 3:04-cv-
03181-MJJ (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4,2004).
6 9 Consolidated Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws at para. 1, In re
Titan, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 3:04-cv-00676-LAB-NLS (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2004).
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Immucor Inc. 70 after disclosure of a government FCPA investigation. In the
case of SciClone Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (SciClone), shareholders filed a
derivative suit four days after the company disclosed the FCPA investigation in
its Form 10-Q filing. 7 1 Avon, BAE Systems, Las Vegas Sands, and Parker
Drilling Company (Parker Drilling) are all litigating shareholder actions while
simultaneously negotiating with the government regarding the bribery
allegations.
In fact, in some cases, suits are filed based on illegal payments or
inadequate controls-things that might be expected to draw DOJ or SEC FCPA
scrutiny in the future. As mentioned, in April 2012, following the New York
Times story disclosing bribery by Wal-Mart de Mdxico, shareholders filed suit
arguing that the behavior alleged in Mexico would violate the FCPA and would
draw costly enforcement against the company.72 Blum ex rel. Dow Chemical
Company v. Liveris et al. and The Dow Chemical Co., the first of several
complaints against Dow Chemical Company that were later consolidated, did
not even discuss the FCPA. 73 The basis of the complaint was a breach of
fiduciary duties in connection with bribery related to a Kuwaiti joint venture,
which had triggered an investigation by the National Assembly of Kuwait. 74
IV. SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUITS
Shareholder derivative suits in the FCPA context are not new,75 but they are
growing in scope and number. 76 Two dozen FCPA-related shareholder suits
were filed in 2010 alone.77 The majority of the recent shareholder derivative
suits filed in the wake of FCPA actions have been dismissed, a handful have
settled, and none have been fully litigated on the merits.
70 Consolidated Class Action Complaint at para. 1, In re Immucor, Inc. Sec. Litig., No.
1:05-cv-02276-WSD (N.D. Ga. Feb. 2, 2006).
71 See SciClone Class Action Complaint, supra note 61.
72 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Quarterly Report, supra note 4.
7 3 See generally Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint, Blum ex rel. Dow Chem.
Co. v. Liveris, No. 4349-CC (Del. Ch. Feb. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Dow Complaint].74 Memorandum Opinion at 1, In re Dow Chem. Co. Derivative Litig., No. 4349-CC
(Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2010) (the derivative action against Dow was dismissed in January 2010).
7 5 See, e.g., Burt ex rel. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Danforth, 742 F. Supp. 1043,
1048-49 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (excusing pre-suit demand under Maryland law in an action based
in part on allegations of FCPA violations because plaintiffs suggested a situation where the
board could have to sue itself for engaging in illegal activity).76 Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 1, Strong ex rel.
Tidewater Inc. v. Taylor, No. 1 1-392-HGB, 2011 WL 7638286 (E.D. La. Sept. 1, 2011)
[hereinafter Tidewater Memorandum] (describing shareholder derivative suits filed after a
public company's settlement of FCPA charges as a "growing trend").
7 7 Brian Grow, Bribery Investigations Spark Shareholder Suits, REUTERS (Nov. 1,
2010) http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/ 1 /us-bribery-lawsuits-idUSTRE6AO4CO
20101101. Only thirty-seven suits were filed between 2006 and 2010. Id.
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The pleading requirements for shareholder derivative suits are stringent and
include making a pre-suit "demand" on the board that it sue to enforce the
corporation's rights. In practice and as discussed below, few suits survive the
defendant's motion to dismiss.
A. Procedural Difficulties Bringing Shareholder Derivative Suits
In a shareholder derivative action, the merits of which are governed by the
law of the state in which the corporation is organized, the cause of action
(alleged harm) and the recovery belong to the corporation. 78 As the Supreme
Court explained in 1991, derivative suits were devised "to place in the hands of
the individual shareholder a means to protect the interests of the corporation
from the misfeasance and malfeasance of 'faithless directors and managers.' 79
Two fundamental difficulties arise with allowing shareholders to sue on
behalf of their corporations. First, since "directors, rather than shareholders,
manage the business and affairs of the corporation," 80 the decision to bring a
lawsuit ordinarily rests with directors (or management acting under their
authority), not shareholders. Most business decisions are protected from
shareholder suits, and thus judicial scrutiny, by the business judgment rule. 8 1
Second, shareholders (and their lawyers) may bring suit with claims of
questionable merit in the hopes of extracting a settlement from the company's
directors in exchange for going away. A settlement may include governance or
management changes and a monetary component paid by management (or more
likely the company's directors' and officers' insurance carrier) to the
company. 82 Significantly, attorneys' fees and expenses are often paid as part of
such a settlement. 83 Some suits may not be in the interests of the company and
7 8 Freuler ex rel. Parker Drilling Co. v. Parker, 803 F. Supp. 2d 630, 636 (S.D. Tex.
2011). The shareholders (through their attorneys) sue the corporation on its own behalf, and
some or all of the directors. Id. at 635-40. The shareholder plaintiff must plead futility of a
demand for a majority of the director defendants, with individual allegations for each
director. Id.7 9 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95 (1991) (quoting Cohen v.
Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949)).
80In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 120 (Del. Ch. 2009).
Delaware General Corporation Law §141(a) articulates the cardinal precept of corporation
law: "The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §141(a)
(2011).
81 The business judgment rule is a rebuttable presumption that director decisions
regarding the operation and management of the company are informed, in good faith, and in
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. Rales v.
Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932-33 (Del. 1993); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984).82 Michael Klausner and Jason Hegland, How Protective Is D&O Insurance in
Securities Class Actions? Part 1, 23 PROF. LIABILITY UNDERWRITING SOC. J. 1 (Feb. 2010).
83 ALAN PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH
537 40 (2010).
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may distract company management from its primary obligation: running the
company.
Confronting both these difficulties, the challenge for the law has been to
devise rules that allow meritorious cases (against "faithless directors and
managers") to go forward, while discouraging cases without merit, in which
unfortunate companies are "held up" by second-guessing shareholders and their
lawyers.8 4 Stringent pleading requirements may serve this purpose. Plaintiffs
must either make a pre-suit "demand" on the company board, i.e., request that
the board sue to enforce the corporation's rights, or demonstrate that the
demand requirement should be excused.8 5 That is, a shareholder who wishes a
company to pursue its legal rights against its management (for not detecting or
preventing violations of the FCPA) must demand that the company do so, and if
the company does not sue, must show that this decision was wrong in the face
of the business judgment rule. Alternatively, the shareholder may maintain that
the management is so conflicted that there was no need to ask. If a pre-suit
demand is not made, then plaintiffs must plead with particularity facts showing
that a demand would have been futile. 86
The substantive standards used to evaluate the particularity of the pleading
in a shareholder derivative action come from state law.87 Under the corporation
law of many states, directors are entitled to the presumption that they were
faithful to their fiduciary duties.8 8 In Delaware, for example, in order to
determine whether a demand on the board should be excused as futile, courts
often use the test established in Aronson v. Lewis: "[W]hether, under the
particularized facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that: (1) the directors
are disinterested and independent [or] (2) the challenged transaction was
otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment." 89 A pre-suit
demand may be excused as futile if a majority of the current directors have such
84 See Kamen, 500 U.S. at 95.
8 5 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1(b)(3) (requiring plaintiffs to "state with particularity: (A) any
effort by the plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the directors or comparable
authority ... and (B) the reasons for not obtaining the action or not making the effort").
Cognate state rules provide the procedural requirement. Aronson is an example of a case
concerning the substance of the requirement. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 808; see also Rales, 634
A.2d at 932; In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 120.
861n re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 120.
87 Harper Woods Emps. Ret. Sys. ex rel. BAE Sys. PLC v. Olver, No. 07-1646, at 7
(D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2008) [hereinafter BAE Opinion] (under the Internal Affairs Doctrine, the
substantive law governing a corporation's internal affairs such as relations between the
corporation's directors and shareholders comes from state in which the corporation is
established). To decide if an FCPA shareholder derivative action should proceed, therefore,
a court looks to Delaware, or New York or Texas or even UK law. Not surprisingly, many of
the FCPA-based shareholder derivative actions involve corporations incorporated in
Delaware, so an analysis of the standards will begin with Delaware law. Id. at 7-8.
8 8 Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1048
(Del. 2004) (making this point under Delaware law).
8 9Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
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a personal interest in the matter that they could not make a proper business
judgment if a demand were made. 90
Sometimes, however, as in FCPA cases, there is no single, particular
"challenged transaction"-no conscious decision by directors to act or refrain
from acting. Many states, including Delaware, distinguish between two types of
allegations: ones related to a particular transaction or board decision, and ones
not related to a particular board action, but rather to ongoing oversight or
monitoring of the corporation's affairs. In cases of such board inaction, the
shareholder derivative complaint must "create a reasonable doubt that, as of the
time the complaint is filed, the board of directors could have properly exercised
its independent and disinterested business judgment in responding to a
demand." 9 1
The standard for considering allegations of managers' failure to oversee the
affairs of the corporation was set forth in In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative
Litigation (Caremark).92 In Caremark, the Delaware Chancery Court
considered a proposed settlement of a shareholder derivative action arising out
of Caremark's $250 million in liabilities incurred because of a U.S. government
investigation of Caremark employees' violations of health care laws. 93 The
Caremark opinion articulated the standard for breach of the board's duty to
exercise appropriate attention or oversight to be an "unconsidered failure of the
board to act in circumstances in which due attention would, arguably, have
prevented the loss." 9
4
In Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter (Stone), the Delaware
Supreme Court approved and clarified the necessary conditions for director
oversight liability. 95 In Stone, shareholders of AmSouth Bank's parent company
filed a derivative action after AmSouth Bank incurred large fines for anti-
money laundering law violations. 96 In affirming the Court of Chancery's
dismissal of the Stones' complaint for failure to make a demand, the Delaware
Supreme Court said that, under Caremark, the necessary preconditions for
director oversight liability are:
a. "the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information
system or controls; or
90 d. at 814-15.
9 1 Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 1993) (emphasis added); see also In re
Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 120 (stating that "plaintiffs complain of board inaction and do not
challenge a specific decision of the board, there is no 'challenged transaction' and the
ordinary Aronson analysis does not apply").92 In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
931d.
94 1d.
9 5 Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).96 1d. at 364.
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b. having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention." 97
In sum, shareholders filing suit in a derivative action related to the
company's FCPA violations, in overcoming the pre-suit demand requirement,
will likely have to demonstrate that the majority of the company's board was
either: (1) not independent and disinterested (through particularized allegations
of fact regarding each director); or (2) faced "a substantial likelihood of
personal liability" due to their virtually complete failure to oversee the
company. 98 These procedural requirements make it very difficult for
shareholders to bring derivative suits holding directors and managers
responsible for a company's FCPA liabilities.
B. What Harms Do FCPA-Based Derivative Suits Allege?
In the FCPA context, shareholder derivative actions allege that the
directors, executive officers, or both breached their fiduciary duties by not
preventing the company's FCPA violations. As discussed below, in some cases,
shareholders have argued that a "conscious disregard" of directors' duty to
monitor resulted in their failure to detect or prevent the FCPA violations. In
other cases, however, shareholders have alleged more direct facilitation of or
profiting from the company's violations. 99
Unsurprisingly, many of the complaints construe fiduciary duty broadly. In
the wake of allegations that BAE Systems PLC made improper payments to a
Saudi official in connection with the sale of military aircraft, the plaintiff
971d. at 370. The Caremark court had acknowledged that such a claim, alleging
"breach of [directors'] duty of attention or care in connection with the ongoing operation of
the corporation's business ... is possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon
which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment." Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.
9 8 See Tidewater Memorandum, supra note 76, at 7 11. The demand standard imposed
may vary based on whether or not the company is incorporated in Delaware and whether or
not suit is brought in Delaware courts. Id. at 7. Of the thirteen companies that were the
object of FCPA-related derivative suits analyzed for this Article, eight are incorporated in
Delaware. Once consolidated, only two of the actions were heard in Delaware courts. Two
others were heard in other state courts. The remainder were heard in federal courts in a
variety of circuits (in D.C., Florida, Texas, New York, Louisiana, Nevada, New Jersey and
California). The author has analyzed these cases and tabulated these totals in an informal,
unpublished survey. See Statistics Relating to Where Suits Are Brought (Aug. 26, 2012) (on
file with author). The debate over whether derivative cases are brought in state or federal
court is both rich and contentious, and this Article is not intended to make a fully argued
contribution to that conversation. See sources cited infra notes 214-17.
9 9 See, e.g., Consolidated Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint at para. 30,
Moradi ex rel. Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. Adelson, No. 2:11 -cv-00490-MMD-RJJ (D. Nev.
Nov. 21, 2011) (alleging that defendant director Adelson, Chairman of the Board and CEO
of the company, "purposefully directed the Company to violate the FCPA... by
encouraging Sands employees to improperly induce senior Macau government officials").
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shareholders in City of Harper Woods Retirement System ex rel. BAE Systems
PLC v. Olver alleged that the board and some of the company's officers and
directors engaged in:
intentional, reckless and/or negligent breaches of their fiduciary duties of care,
control and candor, involving illegal, improper and/or ultra vires conduct,
including causing BAE to violate the laws of the United States and
international business conduct codes and conventions relating to honest trade
and business practices by making, or permitting to be made, improper and/or
illegal bribes, kickbacks and other payments. 100
In May 2011, just a month after Johnson & Johnson shareholders learned of
the company's widespread scheme to bribe doctors in Europe and pay
kickbacks in Iraq 1°1 and the fact that those payments had led to a nearly $70
million settlement with the SEC and DOJ, the shareholders filed a derivative
action. 10 2 The suit alleged that the Johnson & Johnson directors, who were
responsible for causing the company to implement the FCPA, consciously failed
to act and were therefore liable to the company for their breach of fiduciary
duty: 10 3
The directors of a corporation are responsible for managing its affairs.
They owe the corporation an unremitting duty of loyalty and, therefore, must
fulfill those functions lawfully and in accordance with the statutes, rules and
regulations applicable to its business. When faced with a known duty to act,
such as in the case of requiring the corporation to comply with federal laws,
directors who fail to cause the corporation to act breach their duty of loyalty
and may be held liable to the corporation for damages. 10 4
In Murray White ex rel. Avon Products, Inc. v. Andrew Jung, the plaintiffs
alleged that because Avon operated in countries with a "higher than normal risk
of corruption, Avon's directors and officers had a fiduciary duty to install and
administer an FCPA compliance program with controls and accounting systems
sufficient to detect, deter, and ultimately prevent the improper payments that
appear to be at the heart of the FCPA-related investigations" that were being
conducted by the government. 10 5 The plaintiff shareholders later alleged that
"[a]s a direct result of Defendant's [directors'] fiduciary failures to implement
100 Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint at para. 1, City of Harper Woods Emps.
Ret. Sys. ex rel. BAE Sys. PLC v. Olver, No. 1:07-cv-01646 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2007)
[hereinafter BAE Complaint].
101 See J&J Complaint, supra note 66, at para. 7.
102 Id. at para. 3.
1031Id. at para. 19.
1041d. at para. 41.
105 Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint at para. 26, White ex rel. Avon Prods.,
Inc. v. Jung, No. 1:10-cv-05560-RMB (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2010) [hereinafter White Avon
Complaint].
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FCPA-compliant internal controls systems, Avon has been exposed to
enormous damages and injuries."' 1 6 In that later consolidated complaint, the In
re Avon Products, Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation plaintiffs asserted:
The directors of a New York corporation are responsible for the oversight
of its business and affairs. Because of this, directors owe the corporation an
unremitting duty of loyalty, a duty which included a strict obligation to
conduct the corporation's business in accordance with federal statutes,
including the FCPA, which directly and materially impact its business and
affairs. 107
There are also often additional claims in the suits: some allege unjust
enrichment, 0 8 abuse of control,109 gross mismanagement,11 0 or waste. 111
C. How Are FCPA-Based Shareholder Derivative Suits Faring?
1. The Pre-suit Demand Requirement
As discussed above, in order to establish demand futility in a derivative suit,
shareholders suing for management's failure to prevent or management's
contribution to FCPA liability "must show with particularized facts that the
directors knew they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations or that the
directors demonstrated a conscious disregard for their responsibilities such as
failing to act in the face of a known duty to act."1 12 In a world in which large
companies doing business internationally generally have FCPA compliance
programs, demonstrating that directors are so disengaged may present an
insurmountable barrier to plaintiff shareholders. 113 For example, the FCPA-
related derivative actions filed against BAE Systems, Baker Hughes, Dow, and
Parker Drilling were all dismissed for failing to make a pre-suit demand or,
alternatively, to demonstrate director failure or interest that would render such
demand futile. 114
106 Avon Consolidated Complaint, supra note 34, at para. 3.
10 7 Id. at para. 4.
108 See, e.g., Tidewater Complaint, supra note 63, at paras. 158 62.
109 White Avon Complaint, supra note 105, at paras. 62-65.
110 See, e.g., Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint at paras. 89-93, Freuler ex rel.
Parker Drilling Co. v. Parker, No. 4:10-cv-3148, 2010 WL 3478894 (S.D. Tex., Aug. 31,
2010).
111BAE Complaint, supra note 100, at paras. 153 56.
112 Freuler ex rel. Parker Drilling Co. v. Parker, 803 F.Supp. 630, 640 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
113 Of the 13 recent FCPA-related derivative actions analyzed for this Article, five have
been dismissed, five have a motion to dismiss pending, one is newly filed, and two have
settled. See Statistics Relating to Where Suits Are Brought, supra note 98.
114 Baker Hughes, Dow, and Parker Drilling are Delaware corporations. See generally
Department of State: Division of Corporations, ST. DEL., https:Hdelecorp.delaware.gov/tin/
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In May 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas
considered a shareholder derivative action filed by shareholders of Baker
Hughes, following the company's (at the time) record-breaking $44 million
settlement with the SEC for FCPA bribery charges connected with its
operations in Nigeria. 115 In Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund ex rel.
Baker Hughes Inc. v. Deaton,116 shareholders alleged that the Baker Hughes
board of directors failed to implement internal controls to ensure compliance
with the FCPA despite being subject to a 2001 Cease and Desist Order imposed
by the SEC for prior violations of the FCPA. 117
The shareholders alleged that a demand on the board would have been futile
because a majority of the directors were not disinterested and not
independent. 118 The shareholders based their allegations on, for example, the
fact that the board had not filed suit against anyone involved in the alleged
bribery, the fact that the directors would have to sue themselves to obtain a
remedy for the company, the characterization of the directors' conduct as
"egregious," 119 and apparent "entangling financial alliances, interests, and
dependencies" among the board members. 120 The court, however, disagreed and
recommended that the action be dismissed because the plaintiffs "failed to
allege particularized facts that show that a majority of the current Baker Hughes
Board is 'interested' in this litigation, or lacks the independence necessary to
consider a demand. ' 12 1
The court in the BAE Systems derivative action came to much the same
conclusion. In BAE Systems, shareholders sued in response to a series of
payments made by the company to Prince Bandar bin Sultan of Saudi Arabia in
connection with a program through which the United Kingdom sold war planes
to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 122 The payments that were the subject of the
shareholder derivative suit ultimately led to FCPA liability, and BAE Systems
paid a $400 million criminal fine to DOJ, 12 3 as well as a $79 million civil
settlement with the Department of State for alleged violations of the Arms
GINameSearch.jsp?frmFileNumber- (last visited Aug. 14, 2012). BAE Systems PLC is
organized in the United Kingdom, which has even stricter standing and demand
requirements. Companies Index, GBR, http://www.globalbusinessregister.co.uk/Company
Details.aspx?country-GB&companyName-BAE+SYSTEMS+PLC&companyCode01470
151 (last visited Aug. 14, 2012).
115 Baker Hughes Complaint, supra note 65, at paras. 1, 6.
116 Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund ex rel. Baker Hughes Inc. v. Deaton, No.
4:08-cv-01809, slip op. at 4, 2009 WL 6799492, at *6 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
117 Baker Hughes Complaint, supra note 65, at paras. 3, 12.
1181d. at para. 194(d).
119 Baker Hughes, 2009 WL 6799492, at *5, *8.
120 d at *9.
121/ I.at *10.
122 BAE Opinion, supra note 87, at 3.
123 BAE Press Release, supra note 24.
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Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. 124 The
plaintiffs, holders of 3500 BAE Systems American Depository Receipts
(ADRs), alleged breach of fiduciary duties and waste of corporate assets by a
number of current and former BAE Systems directors. 125 Nevertheless,
applying the Internal Affairs Doctrine, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia ruled in December 2009 that the BAE Systems derivative action was
governed by UK law 126 and that under UK law, shareholders were prevented
from bringing derivative actions "except in limited instances."1 27 Because the
shareholder plaintiffs did not show both that the defendants had engaged in
fraudulent conduct involving self-dealing and that the defendants had controlled
general shareholder meetings,1 28 shareholder plaintiffs could not invoke an
exception to the rule that the proper plaintiff in an action to remedy a wrong
done to a corporation is the corporation itself.129 The action was therefore
dismissed. 130
In January 2010, the Delaware Chancery Court dismissed with prejudice the
shareholder derivative complaint against Dow that had been based on bribery in
connection with a joint venture in Kuwait. 131 The court found that the plaintiff
shareholders had not met their burden of demonstrating that a demand on the
Dow board would have been futile; i.e., they did not demonstrate that a majority
of the directors had such a personal stake in the proposed litigation that they
would not have been able to make a proper business judgment in response to a
demand.1 32 In particular, with respect to the plaintiff shareholders' allegations
of breach of fiduciary duty for failing to detect and prevent the alleged bribery
in Kuwait, the court explained that, under Citigroup, a pre-suit demand is
"excused based on a possibility of personal director liability only in the rare
case when a plaintiff is able to show director conduct that is 'so egregious on its
face that board approval cannot meet the test of business judgment, and a
substantial likelihood of director liability therefore exists."' 133 in the Dow case,
the court found that the plaintiffs had not shown that the directors had
knowledge of the bribery, or had any reason to suspect such conduct, and so
could not "consciously disregard" their duty to supervise against bribery. 134
124Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, BAE Systems PLC Enters Civil Settlement of
Alleged Violations of the AECA and ITAR and Agrees to Civil Penalty of $79 Million (May
17, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/163530.htm (calling the
BAE Systems PLC settlement the largest civil penalty in State Department history).
12 5 BAE Opinion, supra note 86, at 7 10.126 Id.
1271d. at 11.
128 d. at 17-20.
12 9 1d. at 12.
130 1d. at 22.
131 In re Dow Chem. Co. Derivative Litig., No. 4349-CC, slip op. at 39 (Del. Ch. Jan.
11, 2010).
13 2 1d. at 22-24.
13 31d. at 31.
134 1d. at 34-35.
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Furthermore, the court ruled that the plaintiffs also "failed to allege facts
suggesting that the Dow board 'utterly failed' to supervise insiders, or that any
director acted with anything other than good faith."'135 Without such showings,
the plaintiffs did not allege facts that established a substantial likelihood of
director liability for oversight failures, and their Caremark claims were
dismissed. 136
A similarly thorough discussion of the standard required to excuse a pre-
suit demand on the board of directors in the context of an FCPA anti-bribery
claim was offered by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas
in Freuler ex rel. Parker Drilling Co. v. Parker (Parker Drilling).1 37 In Parker
Drilling, the plaintiff alleged that the director defendants caused the company
"to operate in Kazakhstan and Nigeria, where corruption and bribery were
rampant," knew of the probability that company representatives were paying
bribes to government officials but still authorized the improper payments, and
failed to establish and maintain internal controls to ensure compliance with the
FCPA and other laws. 138 The plaintiff also alleged that the directors caused or
permitted the company to file false and misleading statements with the SEC that
did not reflect the amount and purpose of the payments made in violation of the
FCPA. 139
The plaintiff did not make a demand on the Parker Drilling board, however,
and the court agreed with the defendants that the plaintiff did not make the
required showing that the board could not make a decision fairly and
independently in the best interests of the company.1 40 The Parker Drilling
court, rejecting the shareholder plaintiffs' argument that the directors had
"entangling financial alliances and interests and dependencies," 14 1 noted
"Delaware courts have made clear that a plaintiff showing that demand would
be futile must do more [than] conclusorily assert entangling alliances."' 142
Similarly, the Parker Drilling court required a specific, individualized showing
when plaintiffs alleged that members of the board benefited from the alleged
wrongdoing enough to produce interest or to render them incapable of
exercising independent, objective judgment in deciding whether to bring an
action. 143 The court explained: "to establish oversight liability a plaintiff must
show with particularized facts that the directors knew they were not discharging
their fiduciary obligations or that the directors demonstrated a conscious
13 51d. at 35.
136 Id.
13 7 Freuler ex rel. Parker Drilling Co. v. Parker, 803 F. Supp. 2d 630 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
13 8 d. at 641.
1391d.
1401d. at 651.
141 Id. at 646.
142 Parker Drilling, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 646 (citing Beam ex rel. Stewart v. Stewart, 845
A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004) ("To render a director unable to consider demand, a
relationship must be of a bias-producing nature.").
14 31d. at 636 37.
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disregard for their responsibilities such as failing to act in the face of a known
duty to act." 144 The court also clarified:
[W]hile to excuse demand, a derivative action plaintiff need only raise a
reasonable doubt about the board's ability to impartially consider the demand,
where the plaintiff alleges the board cannot because it faces potential liability,
the plaintiff needs to show "a substantially likelihood of personal liability
exists since the mere threat of liability is insufficient."145
Parker Drilling also pointed out that the existence of illegal behavior by the
corporation does not necessarily mean that internal controls were deficient and
the board must have known so. 146 Both the Parker Drilling and Baker Hughes
opinions also noted Caremark's position that no rationally designed system of
information can avoid all wrongdoing. 147
Parker Drilling cited the 2009 Baker Hughes decision dismissing the
FCPA-related shareholder derivative claims as the court dismissed the action
for failing to satisfy the particularity requirement in pleading that demand was
excused because plaintiffs did not describe how each individual board member
benefitted from the FCPA violations or identify the particular benefits in each
case: "Because Plaintiffs have failed to state particularized facts to support their
allegations, they have not shown that demand is futile." 14 8
Courts evaluating FCPA-related shareholder derivative suits have also
considered the impact of pre-suit demands made in other "sibling" suits. In their
derivative action on behalf of Johnson & Johnson in connection with the
settlement that the company reached with the government for FCPA violations,
the shareholders did not make a demand on the board and argued inter alia that
a demand would be futile based on the experience of other shareholders who
had made a demand. The demand in the other "sibling" suit had led to the
establishment of a Special Litigation Committee by the board, which the
committee ultimately decided not to sue.
In its Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated
Complaint, the company argued that a demand must be made by the suing
shareholders, and if those shareholders decide that demand is futile, they cannot
rely on the demands made by other shareholders to bolster their case. 149
144 Id. at 640. This language was also cited by the Baker Hughes judge in dismissing that
claim. Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund ex rel. Baker Hughes Inc. v. Deaton, No.
4:08-cv-01809, 2009 WL 6799492, at *6 (S.D. Tex. May 7, 2009).
145 Id. at 640 (internal citation omitted).
146 Id.
14 7 1d.; Baker Hughes, 2009 WL 6799492, at *6.
148 Parker Drilling, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 647 n.25.
149Johnson & Johnson Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss the
Consolidated Complaint at 19, Wollman ex rel. Johnson & Johnson v. Coleman, No. 3:11-
CV-02511-FLW-DEA (D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2011) (arguing that the board's response to one
derivative plaintiff cannot form the basis for an assertion of demand futility by another). At
the time of this writing, the status of that motion is unclear. On January 26, 2012, the court
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Some shareholder suits, faced with a likely motion to dismiss and the
difficulty of demonstrating demand futility, may decide to go ahead and make a
demand on the board of directors. In the case of Avon, for example, the
information about additional non-compliance at the company, and the widening
DOJ and SEC investigations, led the plaintiffs to seek voluntary dismissal of
their derivative complaint in order to make a demand. In February 2012, the
plaintiffs told the court: "In light of the continuing revelations, and the
probability that the investigation is unlikely to end anytime soon, Plaintiffs
believe that the most efficient way to proceed is to voluntarily dismiss the
action in order to make a demand upon the Avon Board of Directors."'150
Matters at Avon Products, Inc. have since been in flux: on April 9, 2012, the
company announced that it was replacing its CEO, Andrea Jung; 15 1 later that
month the company received an unsolicited takeover bid from Coty, Inc., but on
May 15, 2012, Coty announced it was withdrawing its offer.152
2. Settlement
A handful of the FCPA-related shareholder derivative suits have settled. In
April 2009 Faro Technologies, Inc. (Faro), a Florida company which makes
portable computer-aided measuring equipment, settled a shareholder derivative
suit alleging Caremark claims, i.e., that Faro directors and officers breached
their fiduciary duties by not properly overseeing the company's affairs, 153
which included improper payments to Chinese government officials. 154
Interestingly, the plaintiff in the Faro derivative action did make a demand on
the board, which established a Special Litigation Committee to consider his
allegations. However, before the committee made its recommendation, the
company settled the derivative action, noting the contemporaneous FCPA-
related securities fraud class action suit that had survived a motion to dismiss
administratively terminated Johnson & Johnson's motion to dismiss "for purposes of
managing the Court's docket. The motion shall be re-listed upon Plaintiffs' filing of their
opposition brief." See Docket Entry, Wollman ex rel. Johnson & Johnson v. Coleman, No.
3:11-cv-02511-FLW-DEA (D.N.J.). Other suits, including those against Hewlett Packard,
Tidewater, and Las Vegas Sands are currently pending decisions on the defendants' motions
to dismiss.
150 Plaintiffs' Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Action at para. 16, In re Avon Prods., Inc.
S'holder Derivative Litig., No. 1 :10-cv-05560-KBF (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2012).
151Press Release, Avon Prods., Inc., Avon to Separate Roles of Chairman and CEO
(Dec. 13, 2011), available at http://media.avoncompany.com/index.php?s-10922&item-
96618.
152Avon Shares Slide after Coty Withdraws Takeover Offer, REUTERS, May 15, 2012,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/15/us-avon-shares-idUSBRE84DOGO
20120515 (reporting that Coty, Inc. withdrew its $10.7 billion bid because Avon had missed
its deadline to begin discussions).
153 Faro Derivative Complaint, supra note 61, at para. 13.
154 1d. at paras. 48 50, 73 76.
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and settled. 155 The derivative action settlement required Faro to adopt specific
corporate governance policies for the next three years, including a strict
definition of independent directors, an increase in their responsibilities and role
on the board, as well as officer and director stock ownership requirements. 156
The October 3, 2011, settlement between SciClone Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(SciClone), a Delaware company, and its shareholders was even more detailed.
In re SeiClone Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation alleged
that the board failed to cause SciClone to implement internal controls and
systems. 157 The SciClone settlement included over ten pages of detailed
corporate governance policies that the company was to implement to assure
future compliance with the FCPA and similar anti-corruption laws, including
requirements relating to:
* Consequences to employees for FCPA violations or other criminal
misconduct,
* Establishment of a compliance coordinator,
* A compliance program and code,
" Internal controls and compliance functions,
* The use of foreign agents and distributors,
* Employee compliance training,
* Clawback requirements in the event of restatement, and
* A whistleblower program. 158
The SciClone settlement requirements were unusual because they were so
specific. For example, the settlement dictated guidelines for gifts, honoraria,
travel and charitable donations, 159 language about SciClone's commitment to
corporate citizenship, 160 and the required due diligence for hiring foreign
agents. 161
The SciClone and Faro settlements,exceptions to the pattern of dismissals
of FCPA-related shareholder derivative suits, suggest that such suits have the
potential to impact corporate governance requirements, at times substituting the
parties' corporate governance agendas for the judgment of the board.
155 Stipulation of Settlement at 2-3, Alverson ex rel. Faro Techs., Inc. v. Caldwell, No.
6:08-cv-00045-ACC-DAB (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Faro Settlement].
15 6 1Id. at 9-14.
157 Stipulation of Settlement, In re SciClone Pharm., Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., No.
CIV 499030 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Mateo Cnty. Sept. 22, 2010). Significantly, there does not
seem to have been a motion to dismiss filed by the company in the SciClone case.
15 81d. at 4-18.
15 91Id. at para. 2.1 III.A.4.
160 Id. at para. 2.1 III.B. 1.
161Id. at para. 2.1 V.A.
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V. SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS
In addition to shareholder derivative suits, FCPA investigations also spawn
corollary class action securities fraud suits. Unlike derivative suits, securities
fraud suits enforce duties owed by the corporation directly to its shareholders.
They are frequently based on allegations of misrepresentations or omissions of
material facts related to the FCPA violation, which misrepresentations or
omissions allegedly misled shareholders into purchasing or selling their shares,
or otherwise suffering a loss.
A. Securities Fraud Class Action Structure
Grounded in the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act, 162 FCPA-
related securities fraud class action suits focus on the disclosure that a company
made before, during, and after an FCPA violation and investigation. In many
suits, the underlying claim is based on Exchange Act Section 10(b), which
prohibits the employment of "any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors .... 163 SEC Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Exchange Act
Section 10(b), makes it unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 164
Courts have implied a private right of action pursuant to Rule 1 Ob-5.165 In
order to sustain a 10b-5 action, a shareholder must show a misstatement or
omission of a material fact, made with scienter, on which the plaintiff relied and
suffered a loss as a result.
As with shareholder derivative actions, motions to dismiss are frequently
dispositive of securities fraud actions. In addition to general pleading
requirements, securities fraud suits are subject to the provisions of the Private
162 Of course, the FCPA itself is also part of the Exchange Act.
163 Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
164 Exchange Act § 10(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
16 5 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (acknowledging the
Rule lOb-5 private right of action as "beyond peradventure"); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (in which Justice Rehnquist discussed the implied
private right of action, calling it a "judicial oak which has grown from little more than a
legislative acorn"); Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (first
recognizing a private right of action).
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Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the PSLRA). 166 Enacted to curb
frivolous class action lawsuits, 167 the PSLRA imposes additional pleading
requirements on securities class action lawsuits, requiring that claims that
defendants made false statements be pleaded with particularity and that
plaintiffs' pleadings create a "strong inference" of scienter. 16 8
In demonstrating falsity, plaintiffs must specify each statement alleged to
have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading,
and, if an allegation regarding the statement is made "on information and
belief," the complaint must state with particularity all the facts on which that
belief is formed. 169 Showing scienter often proves to be an even greater hurdle.
Plaintiffs are required to state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind. Scienter may
be very hard to show in the pleading (i.e., pre-discovery) phase.
B. What Harms Do FCPA-Based Shareholder Class Action Suits Allege?
FCPA-related securities fraud class actions often allege defective internal
accounting controls and false or misleading statements about business
operations that inflate share prices. For example, in their class action complaint
against Siemens AG, holders of Siemens ADRs alleged that the company had
made a long list of "materially false or misleading statements about Siemens'
business, prospects and operations" during DOJ, SEC, and German regulators'
investigations of its global operations, which "had the cause and effect of
creating in the market an unrealistically positive assessment of
Siemens,... thus causing the Company's securities to be overvalued and
artificially inflated at all relevant times." 170
In their class action securities fraud suit against Faro, plaintiff shareholders
alleged that the company had "deliberately misrepresented information
regarding FARO's financial performance and its systems of internal controls in
order to increase and maintain the Company's stock price ... [including]
reporting of sales that were the product of violations of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act .... -171
166 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.). This is in addition to the high standards imposed by Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-59 (2007).
16 7 H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730 (suggesting that Congress passed the PSLRA to curb abusive practices committed in
private securities litigation).
168 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).
16 91Id § 78u-4(b)(1).
170 Siemens Complaint, supra note 67, at para. 86.
171 Consolidated Second Amended Class Action Complaint at para. 3, In re Faro Techs.,
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 6:08-cv-1818-ACC-DAB (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2007) [hereinafter Faro
Amended Class Action Complaint].
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Similarly, in their suit against freight forwarder Panalpina World Transport
(Holding) Ltd. (Panalpina), the institutional investor shareholder plaintiffs
alleged that "[d]efendants concealed that Panalpina's important operations in
Nigeria depended on bribes to customs agents in Nigeria, violating the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ... and ... [t]he inflated profit margins from
Panalpina's Nigerian business.., masked the true profitability of Panalpina's
other operations."1 72
FCPA-related securities law class actions generally allege a failure of and
misrepresentations regarding the company's internal accounting controls and
therefore the inadequacy of the company's required disclosure. Some
complaints are based solely on violations of the accounting or books and
records provisions of the FCPA. For example, shareholders of Nature's
Sunshine Products, Inc. (Nature's Sunshine), which makes nutritional and
personal care products, alleged that: "(a) the Company lacked requisite internal
controls ... ; and (b) the Company's financial statements were materially
misstated due to its failure to properly account for foreign transactions." 173
In effect, FCPA violations may be seen by securities fraud plaintiffs (and
the plaintiffs' bar) as almost automatic Rule lOb-5 violations. Unless the
company was disclosing the improper payments and/or accounting for them
properly, it is difficult to imagine an FCPA books and records violation that
could not be fashioned into a securities fraud suit.
Many shareholder class actions have targeted companies that have settled
DOJ and SEC FCPA charges at considerable cost. For example, Christine
Johnson ex rel. All Others Similarly Situated vs. Siemens AG, was filed on
December 4, 2009,174 a year after the company's $800 million settlement with
DOJ and the SEC was announced.
Other suits, however, are filed long before settlement of the government's
charges. The plaintiff shareholders in In re China North East Petroleum
Holdings Ltd. Securities Litigation alleged that China North East Petroleum
Holdings Limited (China North), which engages in the exploration and
production of crude oil in China, made a variety of misrepresentations and
accounting overstatements. 175  Among other allegations, the plaintiff
shareholders claimed that China North "[m]isrepresented the state of the
Company's internal controls" and that the CEO and his mother "illicitly
transferred funds from Company bank accounts to their own accounts, and
172 Complaint at para. 4, Deccan Value Advisors Fund L.P. v. Panalpina World Transp.
(Holding) Ltd., No. 5:09-cv-00080 (S.D. Tex. July 23, 2009) [hereinafter Panalpina
Complaint].
173 Class Action Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws at para. 9,
Hyman v. Nature's Sunshine Prods., Inc., No. 2:06-cv-00267-TS-SA (D. Utah Apr. 3, 2006)
[hereinafter Nature's Sunshine Complaint].
174 Siemens Complaint, supra note 67.
17 5 Consolidated Class Action Complaint at para. 4, In re China Ne. Petroleum Holdings
Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2011) (No. 1:10-cv-04577-MGC).
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utilized such funds to pay 'business expenses', in possible violations of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act .... ,,176
Similarly, in the Panalpina class action, shareholders alleged that although
DOJ and SEC investigations were not concluded, "the Company
has... essentially conceded its violations of the FCPA, publicly reporting, for
example, that 'Panalpina has certain indications that, in the past, violations of
the FCPA may have occurred.""' 177 Just the specter of FCPA liability may be
seen as grounds for suit.
In such actions, the shareholders alleged that news of the FCPA issue led to
a share price drop. For example, in the securities fraud action filed against
SciClone, the shareholders alleged that on the day after the company disclosed a
DOJ/SEC FCPA investigation, "SciClone shares declined approximately 30%
on heavier than usual volume."'17 8 In their complaint against Faro, shareholders
claimed: "when the market learned the truth about these prior
misrepresentations, it punished [the company's] stock price."' 179
C. How Are FCPA-Based Shareholder Class Action Suits Faring?
As noted, securities fraud class action suits in the FCPA context are often
decided on motions to dismiss. For such motions, the dispositive factor may be
the plaintiffs' ability to plead scienter with particularity. For example, the suit
against Siemens AG was dismissed on March 31, 2011, for failure to allege
facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter as required under the
PSLRA. 180
The doctrine of "collective scienter," adopted in some but not all circuits, 18 1
is especially relevant to class action securities fraud suits founded on FCPA
violations. Collective scienter means that a company's state of mind for
purposes of establishing a strong inference of scienter at the pleading stage can
be inferred from the collective knowledge of the company's employees and
directors and does not require the plaintiffs to name the particular individuals
who concocted and disseminated the fraud. 182
176 Id
177 Panalpina Complaint, supra note 172, at para. 4.
178 SciClone Class Action Complaint, supra note 61, at para. 31.
17 9 Faro Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 171, at para. 4.
18 0 Memorandum and Order, Johnson v. Siemens AG, No. 1:09-cv-05310-JG-RER
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011).
181The Second and Seventh circuits accept collective scienter. The Fifth and Ninth
circuits reject it. Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 743-44 (9th Cir.
2008).182 Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2008)
(Seventh Circuit decision following the Supreme Court decision in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007), which vacated and remanded the Seventh
Circuit's 2006 decision in Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588
(2006)).
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In 2007, the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of an FCPA-related
securities fraud class action against Syncor International, a provider of high
technology health care services.18 3 Syncor and several of its officers were sued
by shareholders for mischaracterizing the reason for Syncor's strong overseas
earnings: the company did not disclose that the earnings relied on illegal
payments that were being made. 184 The court ruled that the plaintiffs had
pleaded facts showing that certain Syncor directors were aware of the FCPA
violations, for example by citing information from witnesses who claimed that
officers were present at meetings where the illegal payments were openly
discussed. 185 The Syncor litigation settled in 2008 for $15,500,000.186
However, in 2008 the Ninth Circuit considered an appeal of the dismissal of
a class action securities fraud suit against Invision Technologies Inc. (Invision),
a company that makes CT-based detection products used by the aviation
industry to screen baggage.1 87 The lead plaintiffs, Glazer Capital Management,
LP, alleged that Invision corporate officers made misstatements in a merger
agreement with General Electric that was attached to the company's Form 10-K
filing. ' 88 According to the plaintiff shareholders, the merger agreement included
representations by Invision that it was, for example, "in compliance in all
material respects with the provisions of Section 13(b) of the Exchange Act"'189
(which includes part of the FCPA), but in fact Invision had violated the FCPA
by making unlawful payments to government officials in the Philippines,
Thailand, and China. 190
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs' suit for failing to show scienter.
The court ruled that the representations that the company made in its merger
contract with General Electric were standard and did not show the required state
of mind. In particular, the court declined to allow the plaintiffs to rely on
Invision's collective knowledge of the false statements, thus rejecting the
doctrine of collective scienter (in this case, at least) 191 at the pleading stage.
Other FCPA cases have been dismissed on different grounds. In In re China
North East Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Securities Litigation, for example, the
court dismissed the class action suit because the lead plaintiff had not suffered
183 Milton Arbitrage Partners, LLC v. Syncor Int'l Corp. (In re Syncor Int'l Corp. Sec.
Litig.), 239 F. App'x 318, 320 (9th Cir. 2007).
184 Id.
18 51d. at 321.
186 Class Action Amended Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement at para. 3.1, In re
Syncor Int'l Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV-02-8560ABC(RMCx) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2008)
(providing for payment by Cardinal Health, which had acquired Syncor, or Syncor's
insurers). DOJ and SEC penalties totaled $2.5 million.
187 Brief of Plaintiffs Appellants at 6, In re Invision Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig. Glazer
Capital Mgmt. v. Magistri, No. 06-16899, 2007 WL 894949 (9th Cir. Jan. 31,2007).
18 81d. at9.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 11.
191 The court did not clearly rule whether scienter may be pled under a collective theory
in other circumstances. Id.
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any economic loss due to the fact that it held the company's stock, after the
company's corrective disclosure, when the stock price was above the plaintiffs
purchase price (thereby forgoing a chance to sell at a profit).192
More striking than the dismissals, however, are the settlements. 193 A
number of FCPA-related securities fraud suits have settled for amounts in
excess of the penalty assessed by DOJ and/or SEC. In 2007, for example,
Immucor, Inc., a Georgia corporation that manufactures and sells reagents and
systems that detect and identify certain properties of cell and serum components
of human blood prior to transfusion, settled a class action lawsuit related to its
FCPA settlement with the SEC. The SEC investigation centered on payments
made by the company's Italian subsidiary to individuals associated with
government medical facilities. 194 The plaintiffs' complaint survived a motion to
dismiss on October 4, 2006, and, following mediation, the action was settled. 195
On September 26, 2007, the court granted final approval of a settlement
pursuant to which Immucor agreed to pay $2.5 million to the plaintiff class.196
The next day, Immucor settled the SEC investigation, consenting to the entry of
an order that it cease and desist from any further FCPA violations. 197 The SEC
did not impose any monetary penalty against the company, although the
company's president and (former) CEO agreed to a $30,000 civil penalty and
the entry of a cease and desist order against him. 198
A class action securities fraud suit against Willbros Group, Inc. (Willbros),
an independent contractor serving the oil, gas, and power industries, settled in
February 2007 for $10.5 million. 199 Willbros shareholders alleged that the
192 In re China Ne. Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp. 2d 351, 352 53
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
193 Of the twelve recent FCPA-related securities fraud class action suits filed by
shareholders, five have been dismissed, seven have been settled, and one is at a very early
stage.
194 Consolidated Class Action Complaint at para. 8, In re Immucor Inc. Sec. Litig., No.
1:05-cv-02276-WSD (N.D. Ga. Feb. 2, 2006).
195 Stipulation of Settlement at 2, In re Immucor, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:05-cv-02276-
WSD (N.D. Ga. May 14, 2007).
196 Order and Final Judgment, In re Immucor Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:05-cv-02276-WSD
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2007). The court approved the $2.5 million settlement presented in the
Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 196. For more details about the settlement terms, see
Lead Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Final Approval of Class Action
Settlement and Plan of Allocation of Settlement Proceeds, In re Immucor, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
No. 1:05-cv-2276-WSD (N.D. Ga. Sept. 12, 2007).
197Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Making Findings, and Imposing a
Cease-and Desist Order Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, In
re Immucor, Inc. & Gioacchino de Chirico, Exchange Act Release No. 56,558 (Sept. 27,
2007).
198Press Release, Immucor Inc., Immucor Settles SEC Investigation: Court Approves
Class Action Settlement (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://investor.immucor.com/
releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD-396439.
199Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, In re Willbros Group, Inc.
Sec. Litig., No. 05-CV-1778 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2007). The court dismissed the suit, and
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company and certain of its officers and directors made false and misleading
statements that artificially inflated the value of the company's stock 20 0 and
misled shareholders about company operations that triggered SEC and DOJ
investigations into fraud at the company, including illegal and illicit bribery of
foreign government officials in Bolivia, Nigeria, and Ecuador.20 1 The SEC and
DOJ investigations eventually resulted in Willbros agreeing to pay $32 million
in penalties and disgorgement, although several Willbros executives faced
additional charges. 20 2
In 2008, Faro settled a class action securities fraud suit brought by its
shareholders over the company's alleged misrepresentations regarding sales that
were the result of FCPA violations and its failure to implement adequate
internal controls. 20 3 Faro had settled the SEC/DOJ charges for $2.95 million.20 4
Faro settled the securities fraud class action for $6.875 million.
In 2010, Nature's Sunshine settled a securities fraud class action alleging
that the company and three of its chief executives made materially false and
misleading statements regarding the company's business and financial results,
as a result of which the company's stock traded at artificially high prices.20 5 The
suit survived a motion to dismiss in May 2007206 and settled in September 2009
approved the settlement proposed by the parties. See Stipulation of Settlement, In re
Willbros Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 4:05-cv-01778 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2006).
200 [Corrected] Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at para. 59, In re
Willbros Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05-CV-1778, 2006 WL 1443279 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 26,
2006).20 11Id. at paras. 115, 120, 129, 140, 148, 156, 163, 169, 179, 189, 199, 215, 230, 241,
and 251 (discussing the misleading statements about illegal and illicit bribery in Bolivia,
Nigeria and Ecuador) and paras. 12, 104, 105, and 260 (discussing the resulting SEC and
DOJ investigations).
2021press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Willbros Group Inc. Enters Deferred
Prosecution Agreement and Agrees to Pay $22 Million Penalty for FCPA Violations (May
14, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/May/08 crm 417.html
(discussing the DOJ settlement); Willbros Group, Inc., SEC Litig. Release No. 20,571,
Accounting & Auditing Enforcement Release No. 2826 (May 14, 2008), http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20571.htm (outlining the SEC settlement); Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Willbros Int'l Exec. and Consultant Charged in $6
Million Foreign Bribery Case (Dec. 19, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1137.html (discussing charges against James Tillery and
Paul Novak).
203 Consolidated Second Amended Class Action Complaint at para. 3, In re Faro
Technologies Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 6:05-cv-01810-ACC-DAB (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2007).
204 press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Faro Technologies Inc. Agrees to Pay $1.1
Million Penalty and Enter Non-Prosecution Agreement for FCPA Violations (June 5, 2008),
available at http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-crm-505.html.
205 Nature's Sunshine Complaint, supra note 173, at para. 3.
206Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, In re Nature's
Sunshine Prods. Sec. Litig., No. 2:06-cv-00267-TS-CA (D. Utah May 21, 2007).
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for $6 million.20 7 Nature's Sunshine had settled the government charges for
$600,000.208
In general, securities fraud class action suits in the FCPA context seem to
be more successful than derivative actions. 20 9
VI. CONCLUSION
Collateral shareholder litigation increases a company's potential liability for
FCPA violations. The more FCPA enforcement expands, the more opportunities
there are for follow-on suits. This much is clear.
Whether such expansion is a positive development is much less clear. 210
These collateral suits raise numerous normative and empirical questions. At this
juncture, however, it seems safe to say that collateral shareholder litigation
based on FCPA violations has at least three important consequences.
A. Shareholder Suits May Effectively Constitute a Private Right ofAction
Under the FCPA
FCPA-based shareholder litigation may have the same impact as a private
right of action.2 11 As discussed above, the number and impact of collateral suits
is significant. As with statutes that expressly or impliedly establish private
rights of action, violation of the FCPA imposes substantial costs (disincentives)
on companies, and at least potentially provides injured parties with a remedy.
The emergence of a de facto private right of action may be a negative
development. As discussed above in Part III.A, courts have held that Congress
did not intend to create a private right of action. If an FCPA violation, or even a
suspicion of such a violation, constitutes a basis for litigation, and plaintiffs
207 Stipulation of Settlement, In re Nature's Sunshine Prods. Sec. Litig., No.
2:06cv00267-TS (D. Utah Sept. 14, 2009). The court approved the settlement on February
10, 2010. Order and Final Judgment, In re Nature's Sunshine Prods. Sec. Litig., No.
2:06cv00267-TS (D. Utah Feb. 10, 2010).
20 8 Nature's Sunshine Products Inc., SEC Litig. Release No. 21162 (July 31, 2009).20 9 Panalpina also settled the shareholders' class action suit against it in 2010, though
the amount of the settlement was not disclosed. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal with
Prejudice Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), Deccan Value Advisors Fund L.P. v. Panalpina
World Transp. (Holding) Ltd., No. 5:09-cv-00080 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2010).
2 10 Can We Sue Our Way to Prosperity?: Litigation's Effect on America's Global
Competitiveness: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of John H. Beisner, on behalf of the U.S. Chamber
Inst. for Legal Reform, highlighting FCPA-related litigation as an area of substantial
litigation abuse), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Beisner0524201 .pdf.
211 The derivative suits, in particular, do not represent the first time that shareholders
have sought to use state fiduciary law to obtain relief based on a federal statute that does not
provide federal relief for shareholders. See ALAN R. PALMITER, CORPORATIONS: EXAMPLES
& EXPLANATIONS 236 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir.
1974) as an example of the pitfalls of using corporate law to enforce non-corporate norms).
1248 [Vol. 73:5
2012] DOUBLE TROUBLE: SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION& FCPA
may extract a settlement by surviving a motion to dismiss, one may expect
abusive litigation. The only real winner may be the plaintiffs' bar.
In addition, it is not clear that a company will comply more because of
potential shareholder litigation than it would when confronted with the prospect
of only government FCPA enforcement. 2 12 Are additional FCPA compliance
and investigation measures a benefit, or a financial cost, to shareholders?
On the other hand, increased FCPA-based shareholder litigation may be a
positive development. It is unlikely that, in the 1970s, the drafters of the FCPA
envisioned the explosion in global trade and the necessity for fair competition in
global markets, i.e., the global importance of the FCPA.2 13 Nor is Congress
likely to have foreseen penalties in the hundreds of millions of dollars for FCPA
violations, or the resulting battering of a company's share value. These
collateral shareholder suits are confined to the largest FCPA defendants-
publicly-traded companies-and securities law may be an appropriate
mechanism for shareholders to obtain compensation for costly, improper
behavior by the company and its managers.
B. Shareholder Derivative Suits May Heighten the Needfor Compliance
Programs
Many of the FCPA-related shareholder actions review the adequacy of a
company's internal controls in light of the alleged or established FCPA
violation. The mere fact of a violation does not necessarily mean that the
company's internal controls were inadequate2 14 but does result in scrutiny of a
company's corporate governance and compliance procedures.
Caremark considered the question of compliance programs and the board's
duty to oversee or monitor a company's operations. Caremark held that a board
should establish an information and reporting system "reasonably designed to
provide to senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate
information sufficient to allow management and the board, each within its
scope, to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation's
212 In fact, the suits may actually hinder FCPA by distracting management when it is
trying to resolve DOJ and/or SEC actions.2 13 The FCPA's prohibition on bribery of foreign public officials was unique to the
United States for nearly twenty years. It was not until after the adoption of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development's Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention) in 1997
that other countries began to implement similar measures. Organization for Economic
Cooperation & Development, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 112 Stat. 3302, 37 I.L.M. 1, available
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf.
2 14 Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 940 (Del. Ch. 2007) ("Delaware courts
routinely reject the conclusory allegation that because illegal behavior occurred, internal
controls must have been deficient, and the board must have known so.").
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compliance with law and its business performance. " 2 15 Today, in an atmosphere
of enhanced compliance efforts, plaintiffs may allege that the absence of such
procedures represents the kind of "conscious disregard" that signals a breach of
fiduciary duty.
In some cases, plaintiffs may argue that the fact that repeated infractions
took place in spite of controls indicates that the board deliberately ignored the
stated company standards. For example, in the Hewlett Packard action, the
plaintiff shareholders detailed the extensive reporting and compliance
procedures adopted by Hewlett Packard in its effort to prevent employee
misconduct and bring that misconduct to the board's attention. The plaintiffs
pointed to failure of directors to prevent misconduct given these procedures as
evidence of directors' breach of their fiduciary duties. 2 16
Those same measures, however, were identified by the defendant directors
as evidence of internal controls, of a "reporting or information system or
control" like the ones in Caremark and Stone.2 17 in their motion to dismiss, the
defendant directors argued that in Stone the Delaware court had established that
"[i]n the absence of red flags, good faith in the context of oversight must be
measured by the directors' actions to 'assure a reasonable information and
reporting system exists' and not by second-guessing after the occurrence of
employee conduct that results in an unintended adverse outcome." 2 18 They also
relied on the magistrate's opinion (accepted by the court) in Baker Hughes,
which found that Caremark claims based on FCPA violations could not be
asserted when the company had a well-developed program in place to prevent
FCPA violations.
In Dow, the Delaware Chancery Court noted that a company's compliance
system may make a Caremark claim difficult. In a footnote to its
recommendation that the shareholder derivative action be dismissed for failure
to make a demand, the court stated:
The Dow board has set up policies to prevent improper dealing with third
parties. In particular, Dow's Code of Ethics expressly prohibits any unethical
215In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Caremark narrowed the holding in Graham v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co., which
had ruled that "absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and
operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason
to suspect exists." Graham v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. Ch. 1963).
216Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint at paras. 7-8, Saginaw Police & Fire
Pension Fund ex rel. Hewlett Packard Co. v. Andreesen, No. 5:10-cv-04720-PVT (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 19, 2010).2 17 Director Defendants' Notice of Motion and (A) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff s
Verified Shareholder Complaint and (B) Joinder in Support of Nominal Defendant Hewlett-
Packard Co.'s Motion to Dismiss at 13, Saginaw Police & Fire Pension Fund ex rel.
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Andreesen, No. 5:10-CV-04720-EJD (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2011)
(arguing that a Caremark claim could not withstand a motion to dismiss where the board had
policies and procedures in place regarding compliance).2 18 Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 373 (Del. 2006).
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payments to third parties ... [P]laintiffs implicitly acknowledge Dow's
"corporate governance procedures."... Plaintiffs cannot simultaneously argue
that the Dow board "utterly failed" to meet its oversight duties yet had
"corporate governance procedures" in place without alleging that the board
deliberately failed to monitor its ethics policy or its internal procedures.
2 19
C. Procedural Hurdles May Make Federal Securities Law More
Attractive to Plaintiffs than State Corporate Law
As discussed above in Part IV, plaintiffs in a shareholders' derivative suit
must either make a pre-suit demand on the board that the company seek legal
redress (a demand likely to be denied and very difficult to review in light of the
business judgment rule) or plead with particularity the futility of making such a
demand. This requirement is exceedingly difficult for plaintiff shareholders to
fulfill. Because the hurdles to success in a state-law-governed shareholder
derivative action are so high, FCPA-based shareholder litigation may tend
toward securities fraud class actions.2
2 0
It is not clear that such a tendency would be a positive development. In the
wake or the course of an SEC or a DOJ FCPA prosecution, is the crux of a
shareholder complaint really whether the company disclosed its bribes in its
Form 10-K filings? If that is going to be the required standard, then companies
will always be "guilty."
The more productive question is whether the company managers acted
responsibly. Treating corporate governance as a matter of securities law
(disclosure) may obscure the real question: "Was management's supervision
inadequate?"
Thus, FCPA-based shareholder litigation may contribute to the increasing
federalization of corporate law. 221 With the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002222 and the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
219In re Dow Chem. Co. Derivative Litig., No. 4349-CC, slip op. at 35 n.85 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 11, 2010).
220 The possibility of state corporate governance standards migrating to determination
under federal (securities law) rules has been the subject of excellent scholarship. See
generally, e.g., Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware's
Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57 (2009) (analyzing Delaware's corporate law
preeminence, and state and federal competition); Robert B. Thompson, Delaware's
Disclosure: Moving the Line of Federal-State Corporate Regulation, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV.
167 (reviewing Delaware's dominance in the market for incorporations and federal corporate
governance regulation); Robert B. Thompson, Federal Corporate Law: Torts and Fiduciary
Duty, 31 J. CORP. L. 877 (2006) (examining federal law as it relates to corporate governance
as an alternative to state fiduciary duty-based remedies).
221 Of course, the legal predicate of the shareholder litigation discussed here is the
FCPA, part of the federal securities laws.
222 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C. (2008)).
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Protection Act,223 more and more matters traditionally governed by state
corporate law are subject to federal regulation.224 Because the procedural
obstacles to shareholder derivative actions, which are governed by state law,
may cause plaintiffs to bring their complaints as Rule lOb-5 federal securities
law violations, collateral FCPA-based shareholder litigation may push more
corporate governance questions to determination under the federal securities
laws.
22 3 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 922(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010).
2 2 4 E.g., executive compensation, internal accounting controls, hiring of auditors, etc.
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